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Abstract
This article introduces a definition of privacy for Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion schemes. The definition is expressed as an equivalence property which is
suited to automated reasoning using Blanchet’s ProVerif. The practicality of
the definition is demonstrated by analysing the RSA-based Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocol by Brickell, Camenisch & Chen. The analysis discovers
a vulnerability in the RSA-based scheme which can be exploited by a passive
adversary and, under weaker assumptions, corrupt issuers and verifiers. A se-
curity fix is identified and the revised protocol is shown to satisfy our definition
of privacy.
Keywords: Accountability, anonymity, applied pi calculus, Direct Anonymous
Attestation, privacy, ProVerif, trusted computing, TPM, unlinkability.
1. Introduction
Trusted computing allows commodity computers to provide cryptographic
assurances about their behaviour. At the core of the architecture is a hardware
device called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM uses shielded
memory to store cryptographic keys, and other sensitive data, which can be
used to achieve security objectives, in particular, the chip can measure and
report its state, and authenticate. These security objectives assume that a
TPM’s shielded memory protects keys and TPMs are said to be compromised
if this assumption does not hold (see Tarnovsky [66] for a hardware attack that
successful extracts keys from shielded memory).
Cryptographic operations, by their nature, may reveal a platform’s identity
and, as a consequence, the TPM has been perceived as a threat to privacy
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by some users, for example, see Stallman [64, 65] and Anderson [4, 5]. In an
attempt to overcome these privacy concerns, Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14]
have introduced Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), a historical account of
DAA’s development is presented by Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [15].
Direct Anonymous Attestation enables a platform to authenticate in a man-
ner that provides privacy and accountability. The concept is based upon group
signatures with stronger anonymity guarantees, in particular, the identity of a
signer can never be revealed, but certain signatures can be linked (as discussed
below) and signatures produced by compromised platforms can be identified. A
DAA scheme considers a set of hosts, issuers, TPMs, and verifiers; the host and
TPM together form a trusted platform or signer. DAA protocols proceed as fol-
lows. A host requests membership to a group of signers managed by an issuer.
The issuer authenticates the host as a trusted platform and grants an attes-
tation identity credential (occasionally abbreviated credential). A verifier can
authenticate trusted platforms using signatures produced from such credentials.
Brickell, Chen & Li [17, 18] and Chen [29, 31] characterise the following
security properties1 for Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes:
• Anonymity. The identity of a signer cannot be revealed from a signature.
• Non-frameability. An adversary cannot produce a signature associated
with an honest TPM.
• Unforgeability. Signatures cannot be produced without a TPM.
• User-controlled linkability. A signer can control whether her signatures
can be detected as being from the same signer.
A signer defines whether her signatures are linkable (that is, can be detected as
being from the same signer) or unlinkable (that is, cannot be detected as being
from the same signer) at the time of construction.
Our security properties aim to balance the privacy (anonymity and unlink-
ability properties) demands of users with the accountability (linkability, non-
frameability and unforgeability properties) needs of issuers and verifiers. The
distinction between privacy and accountability properties is reflected in our
trust model: anonymity and unlinkability assume that two signers are honest,
whereas, linkability, non-frameability and unforgeability assume that an issuer
is honest. (The issuer must be honest for linkability, since a dishonest issuer
can provide an adversary with a new credential for every signature, thereby
ensuring that two signatures are never linked.) In addition, DAA schemes must
be correct : valid signatures can be verified and, where applicable, linked.
Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14] propose the first concrete instance of a
Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme. Their scheme is based upon RSA and
1The necessity for non-frameability was highlighted by Backes, Maffei & Unruh [8] and
formalised by Chen [29, 31], the remaining properties were formalised by Brickell, Chen &
Li [17, 18].
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support for this scheme is mandated by the TPM specification version 1.2 [67],
which has been defined as an ISO/IEC international standard [47]. Moreover,
TPM version 1.2 is estimated to have been embedded in over 500 million com-
puters [68] (however, the Trusted Computer Group acknowledges that the opt-in
policy – whereby, users must choose to enable the TPM – has hindered devel-
opment [69], moreover, Martin claims that only 5% of these TPMs have been
turned on [54, §6] and we suspect significantly fewer are in active use). Fur-
thermore, the RSA-based DAA scheme has also been included in the ISO/IEC
anonymous digital signature standard [48]. A brief review of other DAA schemes
appears in Appendix A.
1.1. Contribution
We formalise Direct Anonymous Attestation protocols in the applied pi cal-
culus and present a definition of privacy as an equivalence property which is
suited to automated reasoning using ProVerif (Section 4). Informally, the secu-
rity definition asserts that an adversary cannot distinguish between signatures
produced by two distinct signers, even when the adversary controls the issuer
and has observed signatures produced by each signer. The application of the
definition is demonstrated by analysing privacy in the RSA-based DAA protocol
(Section 5). The analysis discovers a vulnerability in the protocol which allows
privacy to be violated by a passive adversary and, under weaker assumptions,
corrupt issuers and verifiers. A fix is identified, and the revised RSA-based DAA
protocol is shown to be secure in the symbolic model. We examine the balance
between privacy and accountability offered by DAA and propose extensions to
DAA (Section 6): we propose a stronger notion of privacy which is intuitively
satisfied by the fixed RSA-based scheme, address an issue which can prevent
linkability, and provide some practical guidelines for basenames to help resolve
a flaw in unlinkability.
1.2. Related work
In the computational model, Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14] introduce
simulation-based models of security and Brickell, Chen & Li [17, 18] propose a
game-based security definition; the relationship between the simulation-based
models and the game-based definition is unknown [34, pp158]. Bernhard et
al. [10] argue that the simulation-based definitions and the game-based definition
are insufficient for accountability due to informal handling of identities and
propose an alternative game-based security definition, moreover, Bernhard et
al. show that the simulation-based model by Chen, Morrissey & Smart [36]
is unsatisfiable (for all protocols there trivially exists a distinction between the
ideal- and real-world). We consider a symbolic definition for privacy, based upon
the game-based definition by Brickell, Chen & Li (we stress that the criticisms
from Bernhard et al. relate to the accountability game and not the privacy
game, hence, their concerns are not relevant to our work). Backes, Maffei &
Unruh [8] formalise an earlier notion of privacy (informally described in [14]) for
the RSA-based DAA protocol. This formalisation is tightly coupled with their
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model of the RSA-based protocol and it is unclear whether other DAA schemes
can be analysed or, indeed, how to analyse alternative models of the RSA-based
protocol. In addition, their formalisation pre-dates the privacy definitions by
Brickell, Chen & Li and considers a conceptually weaker adversary, for example,
signers are only permitted one credential and signatures can only be produced
after both signers have credentials. Finally, our definition is intuitively simpler,
which should aid analysis and, in particular, be better suited to automated
reasoning.
Our earlier work also merits comparison. The attack and fix presented in
this article originally appeared in Smyth, Ryan & Chen [62]. Delaune, Ryan
& Smyth [45] demonstrate a technique to extend the class of equivalences that
can be checked using diff-equivalence and present a high-level description of
how their technique can be used to analyse the fixed DAA scheme. In addition,
Delaune, Ryan & Smyth formalise a notion of privacy for the RSA-based DAA
protocol in an unpublished technical report [44]. This formalisation is subject
to the issues highlighted with respect to Backes, Maffei & Unruh, moreover,
signers may only output one signature, the issuer’s key is assumed to be hon-
estly generated, and subtle properties of the underlying CL signature scheme
are omitted; we overcome these limitations in this article. Furthermore, as wit-
nessed by Backes, Maffei & Unruh, privacy can be checked using the standard
class of equivalences that can be checked using diff-equivalence, rather than the
extended class proposed by Delaune, Ryan & Smyth. Smyth presented a ver-
sion of this article in his thesis [61, Chapter 4], in particular, Smyth’s thesis
contains a formalisation of Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes as processes
in the applied pi calculus, a privacy definition (based upon the cryptographic
game proposed by Brickell, Chen & Li), an analysis of the fixed RSA-based DAA
protocol, and a special case of the Smyth, Ryan & Chen attack which can be ex-
ploited by passive adversaries. The formalisation of DAA schemes as processes
and the privacy definition have been developed by Smyth, Ryan & Chen [63],
in addition, Smyth, Ryan & Chen analyse the ECC-based DAA protocol by
Brickell, Chen & Li [16, 18]. This article collates Smyth, Ryan & Chen [62],
Smyth [61, Chapter 4] and, Smyth, Ryan & Chen [63]; Smyth’s thesis has not
been previously published, hence the analysis of the fixed RSA-based DAA pro-
tocol and a special case of the attack which allows a passive adversary to violate
privacy are new. In addition, this article provides a more detailed discussion of
our results, highlights the limitations of our model, notes some ambiguities in
the cryptographic game by Brickell, Chen & Li, and proposes a refinement to
the RSA-based DAA protocol to help balance privacy and accountability.
2. Calculus of ProVerif
We adopt a dialect [11, 12] of the applied pi calculus [1, 59] which is suited
to automated reasoning using Blanchet’s ProVerif [13]. In this setting, we ac-
knowledge that security claims do not imply the absence of real-world attacks
(see [60, 2, 3, 70, 71], for example), due to the abstract representation of crypto-
graphic primitives. Nonetheless, we believe symbolic analysis is useful because
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computational security methodologies have provided limited success in the anal-
ysis of complex cryptographic protocols [56, 55, 49, 50]. Indeed, Chen, Morrissey
& Smart [34, pp157] attribute flaws in the security proof of RSA-based DAA [14]
to the highly complex nature of DAA schemes and the inherent difficulties of
composing correct provable security proofs.
2.1. Syntax and semantics
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, an infinite set of variables,
and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols (constructors
and destructors), each with an associated arity. A function symbol with arity 0
is a constant. We write f for a constructor, g for a destructor, and h for
either a constructor or destructor. Terms are defined over names, variables, and
constructors applied to other terms (Figure 1). A substitution, denoted {M/x},
replaces the variable x with the term M and we let the letters σ and τ range
over substitutions. We write Nσ for the result of applying σ to the free variables
of N .
The signature Σ is equipped with a finite set of equations of the form M =
N and we derive an equational theory from this set by reflexive, symmetric
and transitive closure, closure under the application of constructors, closure
under substitution of terms for variables, and closure under bijective renaming
of names. We write Σ ` M = N for an equality modulo the equational theory
and Σ ` M 6= N for an inequality modulo the equational theory. (We write
M = N and M 6= N for syntactic equality and inequality, respectively.)
The semantics of a destructor g of arity l is given by a finite set defΣ(g) of
rewrite rules g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l )→M ′, where M ′1, . . . ,M ′l ,M ′ are terms containing
only constructors and variables, the variables of M ′ are bound in M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l ,
and variables are subject to renaming. The term evaluation g(M1, . . . ,Ml) is de-
fined if and only if there exists a substitution σ and a rewrite rule g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l )→
M ′ in defΣ(g) such that Mi = M ′iσ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, and in this case
g(M1, . . . ,Ml) is M
′σ. In order to avoid distinguishing constructors and de-
structors in the definition of term evaluation, we let defΣ(f) be {f(x1, . . . , xl)→
f(x1, . . . , xl)} when f is a constructor of arity l.
The grammar for processes appears in Figure 1. The process let x = D in P else
Q tries to evaluate D; if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is
executed, otherwise, Q is executed. For convenience, the statement let x =
D in P else Q may be abbreviated as let x = D in P when Q is the null pro-
cess. The syntax does not include the conditional if M = N then P else Q,
but this can be defined as let x = eq(M,N) in P else Q, where x is a fresh
variable and eq is a binary destructor with the rewrite rule eq(x, x) → x. We
always include this destructor in Σ. The rest of the syntax is standard (see
Blanchet [11, 12] for details).
The sets of free and bound names, respectively variables, in process P are
denoted by fn(P ) and bn(P ), respectively fv(P ) and bv(P ). We also write
fn(M) and fv(M) for the sets of names and variables in term M . A process P
is closed if it has no free variables. A context C is a process with a hole and we
obtain C[P ] as the result of filling C’s hole with P . An evaluation context is a
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Figure 1 Syntax for terms and processes
M,N ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) constructor application
D ::= term evaluations
M term
eval h(D1, . . . , Dl) function evaluation
P,Q,R ::= processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν a.P name restriction
M(x).P message input
M〈N〉.P message output
let x = D in P else Q term evaluation
context whose hole is not in the scope of a replication, an input, an output, or
a term evaluation.
The operational semantics are defined by reduction (→Σ) in association with
the auxiliary rules for term evaluation (⇓Σ) and structural equivalence (≡). Both
≡ and →Σ are defined only on closed processes. We write →∗Σ for the reflexive
and transitive closure of →Σ, and we write →∗Σ≡ for the union of →∗Σ with ≡.
We occasionally abbreviate →Σ as → and ⇓Σ as ⇓.
2.2. Biprocesses
The calculus provides a notation for modelling pairs of processes that have
the same structure and differ only by the terms and term evaluations that they
contain. We call such a pair of processes a biprocess. The grammar for the
calculus with biprocesses is a simple extension of Figure 1, with additional
cases so that diff[M,M ′] is a term and diff[D,D′] is a term evaluation. The
semantics for biprocesses include the rules in Figure 2, except for (Red I/O),
(Red Fun 1), and (Red Fun 2), which are revised in Figure 3. We also extend
the definition of contexts to permit the use of diff.
Given a biprocess P , we define processes fst(P ) and snd(P ), as follows:
fst(P ) is obtained by replacing all occurrences of diff[M,M ′] withM and diff[D,D′]
with D in P ; and, similarly, snd(P ) is obtained by replacing diff[M,M ′] with
M ′ and diff[D,D′] with D′ in P . We define fst(D), fst(M), snd(D), and snd(M)
similarly.
2.3. Observational equivalence
Intuitively, processes P and Q are said to be observationally equivalent if
they can output on the same channels, no matter what context they are placed
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Figure 2 Semantics for terms and processes
M ⇓M
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn)⇓Nσ
if h(N1, . . . , Nn)→ N ∈ defΣ(h) and σ is such that
for all i, Di ⇓Mi and Σ `Mi = Niσ
P | 0 ≡ P
P | Q ≡ Q | P
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R)
ν a.ν b.P ≡ ν b.ν a.P
ν a.(P | Q) ≡ P | ν a.Q
if a /∈ fn(P )
P ≡ P
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q
P ≡ Q, Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R
P ≡ Q ⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R
P ≡ Q ⇒ ν a.P ≡ ν a.Q
N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).P → Q | P{M/x} (Red I/O)
if Σ ` N = N ′
let x = D in P else Q→ P{M/x} (Red Fun 1)
if D ⇓M
let x = D in P else Q→ Q (Red Fun 2)
if there is no M such that D ⇓M
!P → P | !P (Red Repl)
P → Q ⇒ P | R → Q | R (Red Par)
P → Q ⇒ ν a.P → ν a.Q (Red Res)
P ′ ≡ P, P → Q, Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ → Q′ (Red ≡)
Figure 3 Generalised semantics for biprocesses
N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).P → Q | P{M/x} (Red I/O)
if Σ ` fst(N) = fst(N ′) and Σ ` snd(N) = snd(N ′)
let x = D in P else Q→ P{diff[M1,M2]/x} (Red Fun 1)
if fst(D)⇓M1 and snd(D)⇓M2
let x = D in P else Q→ Q (Red Fun 2)
if there is no M1 such that fst(D)⇓M1 and
there is no M2 such that snd(D)⇓M2
inside. Formally, we write P ↓M when P can send a message on M , that is, when
P ≡ C[M ′〈N〉.R] for some evaluation context C[ ] such that bn(C)∩ fn(M) = ∅
and Σ `M = M ′. The definition of observational equivalence [11, 12] follows.
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence). Observational equivalence ∼ is the
largest symmetric relation R between closed processes such that P R Q implies:
1. if P ↓M , then Q ↓M ;
2. if P → P ′, then Q→ Q′ and P ′ R Q′ for some Q′;
3. C[P ] R C[Q] for all evaluation contexts C[ ].
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We additionally define observational equivalence as a property of biprocesses.
Definition 2. The closed biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence if fst(P )
∼ snd(P ).
Automated reasoning. It follows from the semantics of biprocess that if P −→ Q
for some biprocesses P and Q, then fst(P ) −→ fst(Q) and snd(P ) −→ snd(Q).
However, reductions in fst(P ) or snd(P ) do not imply biprocess reductions in
P , that is, there exist biprocesses P such that fst(P ) −→ fst(Q), but there
is no such reduction P −→ Q, and symmetrically for snd(P ). For example,
consider the biprocess P = diff[a, c]〈n〉 | a(x), we have fst(P ) −→ 0, but there
is no reduction P −→ 0. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [11, 12] have shown that
a biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence when reductions in fst(P ) or
snd(P ) imply reductions in P . Moreover, they propose an automated procedure
for reasoning with observational equivalence of biprocesses and this procedure
has been implemented in ProVerif.
2.4. Assumptions and notation
In this article, all signatures are tacitly assumed to include the constant ∅,
unary destructors fst and snd, and the binary constructor pair. Furthermore,
for all variables x and y we assume the rewrite rules
fst(pair(x, y))→ x snd(pair(x, y))→ y
For convenience, pair(M1, pair(. . . , pair(Mn,∅))) is occasionally abbreviated as
(M1, . . . ,Mn) and fst(snd
i−1(M)) is denoted pii(M).
3. DAA schemes
A Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme comprises of five algorithms [14,
17, 18], each of which will now be discussed.
Setup. The setup algorithm is used by the issuer to construct a DAA key pair
skI and pk(skI), the public part pk(skI) is published. In addition, the setup
algorithm may define implementation-specific parameters.
Join. The join algorithm is run between a trusted platform and an issuer for
the purpose of obtaining group membership. The algorithm assumes that the
trusted platform and issuer have established a one-way authenticated channel,
that is, the issuer is assured to be communicating with a host and TPM. The
definition of DAA does not mandate a particular authentication mechanism
(the Trusted Computing Group recommend encrypting every message sent by
the issuer under the TPM’s endorsement key [67]). On successful completion of
the join algorithm, the issuer grants the trusted platform with an attestation
identity credential cre based upon a secret tsk known only by the TPM.
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Sign. The sign algorithm is executed by a trusted platform to produce a signa-
ture σ, based upon an attestation identity credential cre and secret tsk, which
asserts group membership and, therefore, trusted platform status. In addition
to cre and tsk, the algorithm takes as input a message m and a basename bsn.
The basename is used to control linkability between signatures: if bsn = ⊥,
then signatures should be unlinkable, otherwise, signatures produced by the
same signer and based upon the same basename can be linked (see Section 6 for
further discussion on linkability).
Verify. The verification algorithm is used by a verifier to check the validity of a
signature. The algorithm takes as input a set of secret keys ROGUEtsk, which are
known to have been successfully extracted from compromised TPMs, allowing
the identification of rogue platforms. The methodology used to build ROGUEtsk
is not defined by DAA, see Chen & Li [33] for further discussion.
Link. The link algorithm is used by a verifier to check if two valid signatures
are linked, that is, signed using the same basename bsn and secret tsk.
The inputs and outputs of these algorithms are explicitly summarised in Table 1.
4. Security definition: privacy
Informally, the notion of privacy asserts that given two honest signers A
and B, an adversary cannot distinguish between: a situation in which A signs a
message and a situation in which B signs a message. Based upon the game-based
definition by Brickell, Chen & Li [17, 18], we present the following description
of our privacy property.
Initial. The adversary constructs the DAA key pair skI and pk(skI), and pub-
lishes the public part pk(skI) along with any additional parameters. Moreover,
the adversary may request the public keys of honest TPMs.
Phase 1. The adversary makes the following requests to signers A and B:
• Join. The signer executes the join algorithm with the adversary to cre-
ate cre and tsk. (The adversary, behaving as the issuer, will typically
construct cre but not learn tsk.)
• Sign. The adversary submits a basename bsn and a message m. The
signer runs the sign algorithm and returns the signature to the adversary.
We insist that sign requests to A (or B) must be proceeded by at least one join
request to A (respectively B). Moreover, at the end of Phase 1, both signers
are required to have run the join algorithm at least once.
Challenge. The adversary submits a message m′ and a basename bsn′ to the
signers, with the restriction that the basename has not been previously used if
bsn′ 6= ⊥. Each signer produces a signature on the message and returns the
signature to the adversary.
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Algorithm Input Output
Setup Security parameters. A DAA key pair skI
and pk(skI), and any
implementation-specific
parameters.
Join Trusted platform’s input: the
system parameters (namely,
the DAA public key and
any implementation-specific
parameters defined by the
setup algorithm), the TPM’s
internal secret DAASeed (this
value is defined during manu-
facture [67]), a counter value
cnt selected by the host, and
the TPM’s endorsement key.
Issuer’s input: the system pa-
rameters and the issuer’s pri-
vate key skI .
Trusted platform’s output: a
pair consisting of the attes-
tation identity credential cre
and secret tsk.
Issuer’s output: the public
part of the TPM’s endorse-
ment key.
Sign The system parameters, a veri-
fier’s basename bsn, a message
m, an attestation identity cre-
dential cre, and a secret tsk.
A signature σ.
Verify The system parameters, a ver-
ifier’s basename bsn, a mes-
sage m, a candidate signature
σ form, and a set of secret keys
ROGUEtsk.
1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
Link The system parameters, and
two candidate signatures σ
and σ′ for messages m and m′.
−1 (invalid signature) if the
verify algorithm outputs 0 for
signature σ (or σ′) using the
system parameters, basename
⊥, the messagem (respectively
m′), and the empty set of se-
cret keys. Otherwise, the algo-
rithm returns 1 (linked) if the
signatures can be linked and 0
(not linked) if the signatures
cannot be linked.
Table 1: Summary of inputs and outputs for Direct Anonymous Attestation algorithms
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Phase 2. The adversary continues to probe the signers with join and sign re-
quests, but is explicitly forbidden to use the basename bsn′ used in the Challenge
phase if bsn′ 6= ⊥.
Result. The protocol satisfies privacy if the adversary cannot distinguish be-
tween the two signatures output during the challenge.
Intuitively, our description captures anonymity because the adversary cannot
distinguish between the two signatures output during the challenge. This can
be witnessed as follows. Suppose a protocol satisfies the above description of
privacy but the identity of a signer can be revealed from a signature. It follows
immediately that the adversary can test which challenge signature belongs to
A, therefore, allowing the signatures to be distinguished and, hence, deriving
a contradiction. Moreover, our description also captures unlinkability. This
can be witnessed as follows. Suppose a protocol satisfies our description of
privacy, but a randomly sampled pair of signatures from the same signer can
be linked with non-negligible probability, where the signatures were defined as
unlinkable by the signer. Further suppose that the signatures are on messages
m and m′. Let us consider an adversary that requests a signature σA from A
during Phase 1 using the message m and basename bsn = ⊥ (that is, signatures
should be unlinkable). Furthermore, the adversary submits the message m′ and
basename bsn′ = ⊥ during the challenge, and the signers return signatures
σ1 and σ2. The adversary tests if σA and σ1 are linked or if σA and σ2 are
linked. Exactly one test will succeed with non-negligible probability, thereby
allowing the adversary to distinguish between signatures σ1 and σ2. We have
derived a contradiction and, therefore, a protocol satisfying our description of
privacy provides unlinkability. Formally proving that our security definition
(Definition 3) captures anonymity and unlinkability is beyond the scope of this
article.
Comparison with Brickell, Chen & Li. Our description of privacy clarifies some
ambiguities in the cryptographic game proposed by Brickell, Chen & Li:
• The side condition that both signers must execute the join algorithm at
least once during Phase 1 is only implicitly included in the cryptographic
game by Brickell, Chen & Li with the requirement that “ [the adversary]
chooses two signers’ identities [...]” [18, §2.2.2]. We stress that their cryp-
tographic game is unsatisfiable without this condition, in particular, pri-
vacy can never be achieved in a setting with one signer. Accordingly, we
make the side condition explicit in our description.
• Sign queries with A or B are restricted to the basename ⊥ in Phase 2 of
the cryptographic game, more precisely, Brickell, Chen & Li state “ [the
adversary is] not allowed to make Sign [queries] with bsn if bsn 6= ⊥
[...]” [18, §2.2.2]. However, Chen has confirmed that this was unintentional
and we only forbid sign requests with A or B from using the challenge
basename.
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In addition, there are some high level distinctions between our description of
the privacy property and the cryptographic game proposed by Brickell, Chen &
Li:
1. No key verification. In the cryptographic game a key constructed by the
adversary in the Initial phase is verified, whereas, no verification of the
key is performed in our model.
2. Static corruption of honest TPMs. In the cryptographic game the adver-
sary can dynamically corrupt honest TPMs, whereas, all TPMs except
two are assumed to be corrupt in our model.
3. Indistinguishability definition. In the game-based definition either A or
B signs the message during the Challenge and privacy is satisfied if the
adversary has a negligible advantage over guessing the correct signer. By
comparison, in our definition, we consider a run in which A signs during
the challenge and a run in which B signs during the challenge, and privacy
is satisfied if these runs are indistinguishable.
The first abstraction is trivially sound, but not complete (nonetheless, the level
of abstraction in the symbolic model typically precludes attacks of this type).
The second simplifying abstraction appears to be reasonable since TPMs can
be simulated by the adversarial context. Indeed, this is a typical simplifica-
tion in symbolic models, for example, definitions of ballot secrecy for electronic
voting [51, 41, 7] and privacy for vehicular ad hoc networks [40] also fix the
set of honest participants. However, it is unknown if these simplifications are
sound. The third abstraction is intuitively sound, since an adversary strategy
that can detect whether a signature belongs to A or B can be transformed into
a strategy that distinguishes the signatures of A and B. More precisely, let M
be an adversary that, given a signature σ, returns the identity id = M(σ) of
the signer. A strategy M′ for distinguishing σ1 and σ2 simply tests whether
M(σ1) =M(σ2).
Finally, our model will overcome the following shortcoming in the privacy
game: the cryptographic game does not permit the adversary to interact with
TPMs during the Initial phase. As a consequence, any DAA scheme satisfy-
ing the game-based definition may exhibit the following undesirable property,
namely, if a malicious issuer interacts with TPMs before constructing a key,
then no security assurances are offered. We avoid this limitation by modelling
dishonest TPMs as part of the adversarial context and allow the adversary to
receive the public keys of honest TPMs during the Initial phase. In future work,
the cryptographic game could be revised to allow the adversary to probe the
challenger during the Initial phase (the accountability game exhibits the same
weakness and could be similarly revised).
4.1. Privacy as an equivalence
Informally, privacy asserts that an adversary cannot distinguish between
signatures produced by two distinct signers. We formalise privacy as an ob-
servational equivalence property (Definition 3) using the DAA game biprocess
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DAA-G (Figure 4) parametrised by a pair of processes 〈Join,Sign〉, which model
a DAA scheme’s join and sign algorithms.
Definition 3 (Privacy). Given a pair of processes 〈Join, Sign〉, privacy is sat-
isfied if the DAA game biprocess DAA-G satisfies observational equivalence.
Let us critique the suitability of Definition 3 by relating the operations per-
formed in DAA-G to those performed in our description of privacy.
Modelling the Initial phase. Biprocess DAA-G defines the TPM endorsement
keys ν skA and ν skB (these keys are defined during manufacture [67]), outputs
the public part of these keys, and inputs wparams, where wparams captures in-
putting a public key pk(skI) and any additional parameters from the adversary,
therefore, immediately corresponding to the Initial step of our description. (As
observed by Rudolph [58], and specified in our description and enforced by our
biprocess DAA-G, privacy can only be expected if both signers use the same sys-
tem parameters, that is, the signers do not accept distinct system parameters
from the issuer.)
Modelling Phases 1 & 2. The processes Signer{bA/wb, skA/wek} and Signer{bB/wb,
skB/wek}, which form part of biprocess DAA-G, allow the adversary to initi-
ate two signers and perform arbitrarily many join and sign requests, capturing
Phases 1 & 2 of our description (we over-approximate the capabilities of the
signers and do not formally distinguish between Phases 1 & 2). Formally, we
model a signer’s ability to perform join and sign requests by permitting the
Signer process to instantiate the Join and Sign processes, which are expected to
behave like services, that is, they can be called by, and return results to, the
Signer process. The restricted channel names aj and a
′
j are introduced to ensure
private communication between the Signer and Join processes; similarly, names
as and a
′
s ensure private communication between the Signer and Sign processes.
The bound name cnt is a counter value selected by the host (in this article we
consider a static counter value for simplicity, in particular, we do not model
incrementing a counter) and the bound name DAASeed represents the TPM’s
internal secret (this value is defined during manufacture [67]). The remainder
of the Signer process models a signer’s ability to execute arbitrarily many in-
stances of the join and sign algorithms (as discussed below), and captures an
aspect required by the Challenge phase.
• Join process. The Join process is assumed to act like a service and listens
for input on channel aj . It follows that the Signer process can invoke
the service by message output aj〈(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, skM )〉, where
(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, skM ) models the join algorithm’s parameters. The
Join process is assumed to output results on channel a′j , and this response
can be received by the Signer process using message input a′j(x); the result
is bound to the variable x, and is expected to consist of a pair (xcre, xtsk)
representing the attestation identity credential and TPM’s secret.
Interaction between Sign and Signer is similar.
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Figure 4 Biprocess modelling privacy in DAA
Given a pair of processes 〈Join,Sign〉, the DAA game biprocess DAA-G is defined
as
ν skA . ν skB .
(
c〈pk(skA)〉 | c〈pk(skB)〉 | c(wparams) .
ν bA . ν bB . (Challenge | Signer{bA/wb, skA/wek} |
Signer{bB/wb, skB/wek})
)
such that bA, bB , skA, skB , wb, wek 6∈ (fn(Sign) ∪ fv(Sign) ∪ fn(Join) ∪ fv(Join))
and where
Signer = ν aj . ν a
′
j . ν as . ν a
′
s . ( (!Join) | (!Sign) | (
ν cnt . ν DAASeed .
!aj〈(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, wek)〉 . a′j(x) .
let xcre = pi1(x) in let xtsk = pi2(x) in (
!c(y) . let ybsn = pi1(y) in let ymsg = pi2(y) in
if ybsn = ⊥ then
as〈(wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉 .
a′s(z) . c〈z〉
else
as〈(wparams, (chl+, ybsn), ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉 .
a′s(z) . c〈z〉
) | (
wb〈(xcre, xtsk)〉
)
))
Challenge = ν as . ν a
′
s . ( (Sign) | (
bA(x) . let xcre = pi1(x) in let xtsk = pi2(x) in
bB(y) . let ycre = pi1(y) in let ytsk = pi2(y) in
c(z) . let zbsn = pi1(z) in let zmsg = pi2(z) in
if zbsn = ⊥ then
as〈(wparams, zbsn, zmsg,diff[xcre, ycre],diff[xtsk, ytsk])〉 .
a′s(z) . c〈z〉
else
as〈(wparams, (chl−, zbsn), zmsg,
diff[xcre, ycre],diff[xtsk, ytsk])〉 .
a′s(z) . c〈z〉
))
for some constants chl+, chl−.
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• Sign process. The Signer process first inputs a variable y which is expected
to be a pair representing the verifier’s basename ybsn and a message ymsg.
The invocation of the sign algorithm by the signer is modelled by the mes-
sage output as〈(wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉, where (wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre,
xtsk) represents the algorithm’s parameters. (We shall discuss the distinc-
tion between parameters (wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk) and (wparams, (chl
+,
ybsn), ymsg, xcre, xtsk) in Section 4.1.1.) The sign algorithm is expected to
output a signature which can be sent to a verifier, in the Signer process
this signature is received from the Sign process by message input a′s(z) and
the variable z, representing the signature, is immediately output. The side
condition that a sign request must be preceded by at least one join request
is enforced by the sequential description of the Signer process.
In addition, the processes Signer{bA/wb, skA/wek} and Signer{bB/wb, skB/wek}
communicate their attestation identity credentials (denoted by xcre) and TPM
secrets (denoted by xtsk) to biprocess Challenge using private channels bA and
bB . Moreover, the side condition that signers A and B are both required to have
run the join algorithm at least once during Phase 1 is enforced by the sequential
inputs on channels bA and bB in biprocess Challenge.
Modelling the Challenge phase. Biprocess Challenge forms part of biprocess
DAA-G and is designed to capture the behaviour of the signers in the Challenge
phase of our description. Biprocess Challenge inputs the attestation identity
credentials and TPM secrets produced by the signers. Biprocess Challenge also
inputs a basename and a message from the environment. The inputs (namely,
x, y, and z) to biprocess Challenge are used to construct a signature and the
biprocess uses diff[xcre, ycre] and diff[xtsk, ytsk] to ensure that the signature is
produced by A in fst(DAA-G) and B in snd(DAA-G).
Modelling the Result phase. The Result phase of our description is captured
using observational equivalence.
4.1.1. Limitations
We assume that the processes Join and Sign are initiated by input on chan-
nels aj and as and, similarly, output results on channels a
′
j and a
′
s. Intuitively, it
follows that some processes not satisfying these conditions will satisfy our defini-
tion of privacy, in fact, the pair of processes 〈0, 0〉 will satisfy our definition. We
tolerate this limitation here, and future work could consider a complete defini-
tion of the DAA properties, including: correctness, linkability, non-frameability,
and unforgeability. The correctness property will exclude degenerate pairs of
processes such as 〈0, 0〉. Similar considerations are made in the literature, for
example, degenerate processes can satisfy the definition of ballot secrecy for
electronic voting by Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [42, 43] and the definition of
privacy for vehicular ad-hoc networks by Dahl, Delaune & Steel [40].
The necessity for a distinct basename bsn ′ in the Challenge phase (when
bsn ′ 6= ⊥) is enforced by prefixing the basename zbsn used by biprocess Challenge
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with chl− and, similarly, prefixing the basenames ybsn used by the Signer pro-
cess with chl+. Capturing distinct basenames in this manner introduces an
abstraction.
5. Case study: RSA-based DAA
BEN: When
I re-read, I’ll
check that all
variables are
explained (cf.
Review 2)
The first concrete Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme was introduced
by Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14] and is based on RSA. The TPM speci-
fication version 1.2 [67], which has been defined as an ISO/IEC international
standard [47], mandates support for the RSA-based scheme, and the scheme has
also been included in the ISO/IEC anonymous digital signature standard [48].
In this section, we analyse privacy in the RSA-based protocol using our defini-
tion.
5.1. Primitives and building blocks
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures [25, 52] form the foundations of
RSA-based DAA. Unlike most signature schemes, CL signatures are particularly
suited to DAA since the scheme supports signing committed values and proving
knowledge of a signature is efficient.
Signature scheme. A CL signature is denoted clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg), where
xsk is the secret key, xprime is a random prime, xrand is a nonce, and xmsg is
a message. The prime and nonce components can be derived from a signa-
ture. Verification is standard given a signature, message and public key, namely,
checkclsign(pk(xsk), xmsg, clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = accept.
Signature scheme for committed values. Given the public part of a signing
key pk(xsk), a message xcsk, and commitment factor xcf , the corresponding
commitment is U = clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf , xcsk) and the associated signature is
clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand, U), where yprime is a randomly chosen prime and yrand is a
nonce. This signature can be opened to recover σ = clopen(pk(xsk), xcf , clsign(xsk,
yprime, yrand, U)) = clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand◦xcf , xcsk) – that is, the signature on xcsk
– where ◦ is commutative and associative. (A proof should also be provided to
demonstrate that σ does not contain a covert channel – such details will be
omitted from the model presented here – see Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14]
or Smyth [61, pp159] for further details.)
We also consider commitments commit(xpub, xcsk), where xpub is a public pa-
rameter and xcsk is a message. Our ternary commitment function differs from
our binary commitment function by taking a commitment factor as an addi-
tional parameter, this corresponds to the distinction made by the underlying
mathematical primitives and permits signatures on committed values to be con-
structed.
We will adopt the notation introduced by Camenisch & Stadler [26] to de-
scribe primitives which prove knowledge of, and relations among, discrete loga-
rithms. For instance, given values K, N , T and U , the expression PK{(α, β) :
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N = commit(T, α) ∧ U = clcommit(pk(K), α, β)} denotes a “zero-knowledge
Proof of Knowledge of α, β such that N = commit(T, α) and U = clcommit(
pk(K), α, β).” In the example, the Greek letters are used for values about which
knowledge is being proved and these values are kept secret by the prover. All
other values, that is, those from the Latin alphabet, are known to the veri-
fier. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [46, 57] allows an interactive zero-knowledge
scheme to be converted into a signature scheme. A signature acquired in this
way is termed a Signature Proof of Knowledge and is denoted, for example,
as SPK{(α) : N = commit(T, α)}(m), where m is a message. The RSA-based
DAA scheme uses proofs of knowledge to demonstrate possession of attestation
identity credentials.
Proving knowledge of a signature. The signature scheme for committed val-
ues can be used to build an anonymous credential system. Given a signature
σ = clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xcsk) and commitment factor xcf , an anonymous cre-
dential σˆ = clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf , σ). The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
PK{(xcsk, xcf) : checkclsign(pk(xsk), xcsk, clopen(pk(xsk), xcf , σˆ)) = accept} can
then be used to demonstrate that the anonymous credential σˆ is indeed a com-
mitment to a signature on the message xcsk using commitment factor xcf .
The application of our primitives to construct the RSA-based DAA protocol
will be considered in the next section.
5.2. Protocol description
For the purpose of studying privacy, it is sufficient to consider the join and
sign algorithms. The join algorithm (Figure 5) is defined below, given the
algorithm’s input: system parameters pk(skI), bsnI , and KI (that is, the DAA
public key, basename, and the long-term key); the TPM’s secret DAASeed; a
counter value cnt; and the TPM’s endorsement key pk(skM ).
1. The host computes ζI = hash(0, bsnI) and sends ζI to the TPM. The
TPM computes secret tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(KI)), cnt, 0) and
derives the commitment NI = commit(ζI , tsk). The TPM also gen-
erates a blinding factor v′, which is used to compute the commitment
U = clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk). The trusted platform sends U and NI to
the issuer.
2. The issuer generates a nonce ne, encrypts the nonce with the TPM’s en-
dorsement key pk(skM ), and sends the encrypted nonce to the TPM. The
TPM decrypts the ciphertext to recover ne, computes aU = hash(U, ne)
and sends aU to the issuer, therefore authenticating as a trusted platform.
(Note that the RSA-based DAA protocol does not rely on the authentica-
tion technique recommended by the Trusted Computing Group.)
3. The trusted platform generates a signature proof of knowledge that the
messages U and NI are correctly formed and sends it to the issuer. The
proof includes a nonce ni generated by the issuer and a nonce nt gener-
ated by the TPM, thereby ensuring that both the issuer and the TPM
contribute to the proof’s randomness.
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Figure 5 RSA-based DAA join algorithm
Trusted platform Issuer
Trusted platform publishes pk(skM )
Issuer publishes pk(skI), bsnI , and KI
tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(KI)), cnt, 0)
Generate v′
ζI = hash(0, bsnI)
NI = commit(ζI , tsk)
U = clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk)
NI , U .
Generate n, ne
E = penc(pk(skM ), n, ne)
/ E
aU = hash(U, dec(skM, E))
aU .
Generate ni
/ ni
Generate nt
nt, spk .
Generate e, v′′
/ clsign(skI , e, v
′′, U)
where spk is shorthand for SPK{(tsk, v′) : NI = commit(ζI , tsk)∧U =
clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk)}(ni, nt)
4. The issuer verifies the proof and evaluates a policy to decide if a new
credential should be granted (the policy dictates how many distinct cre-
dentials may be issued to a particular trusted platform). To proceed, the
issuer generates a signature clsign(skI , e, v
′′, U) and sends it to the trusted
platform.
5. The trusted platform verifies the signature and opens it to reveal the
credential cre = clsign(skI , e, v
′ ◦ v′′, tsk), that is, the TPM’s secret tsk
signed by the issuer.
The join algorithm outputs cre and tsk, which can be provided as input to
the sign algorithm, along with the system parameters, a basename bsn, and
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message m. The sign algorithm proceeds as follows.
6. If bsn = ⊥, then the host generates a nonce ζ, otherwise, the host com-
putes ζ = hash(0, bsn). The host provides the TPM with ζ. The TPM
generates a nonce w, and computes the commitment NV = commit(ζ, tsk)
and anonymous credential ĉre = clcommit(pk(skI), w, cre). The trusted
platform then produces a signature proof of knowledge that ĉre is a com-
mitment to a valid credential and that NV is correctly formed.
The sign algorithm outputs the signature proof of knowledge which is sent to
the verifier. Intuitively, if a verifier is presented with such a proof, then the
verifier is convinced that it is communicating with a trusted platform.
5.3. Signature and equational theory
Before modelling the RSA-based DAA scheme as a process, we construct
a suitable signature Σ (defined below) to capture the cryptographic primitives
used and define an equational theory to capture the relationships between these
primitives.
Σ = {accept,⊥, 0, 1,Fjoin,Fsign, clgetnonce, clgetprime, hash, pk, commit,
◦, dec, checkclsign, checkspk, clcommit, clopen, penc, spk, clsign}
Functions accept, ⊥, 0, 1, Fjoin, Fsign are constant symbols; clgetnonce, clgetprime,
hash, pk are unary functions; commit, ◦, dec are binary functions; checkclsign,
checkspk, clcommit, clopen, penc, spk are ternary functions; and clsign is a func-
tion of arity four. We occasionally write hash(xplain,1, . . . , xplain,n) to denote
hash((xplain,1, . . . , xplain,n)). The equations associated with these functions are
defined below:
dec(xsk, penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain)) = xplain
clgetprime(clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = xprime
clgetnonce(clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = xrand
checkclsign(pk(xsk), xmsg, clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = accept
clopen(x, xrand, clcommit(x, xrand, xplain)) = xplain
clopen(pk(xsk), xrand, clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand, clcommit(pk(xsk), xrand, xmsg)))
= clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand ◦ xrand, xmsg)
A signature proof of knowledge is encoded in the form spk(F,U, V ), where F
is a constant declaring the particular proof in use, U denotes the witness (or
private component) of a signature proof of knowledge, and V defines the public
parameters and message being signed. The function checkspk is used to verify
a signature and we define the following equations.
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checkspk(Fjoin, V, spk(Fjoin, (xtsk, xcf), V )) = accept
where V = (xζI , xpk, commit(xζI , xtsk), clcommit(xpk, xcf , xtsk), xmsg)
checkspk(Fsign, V, spk(Fsign, (xtsk, xcf), V )) = accept
where V = (xζ , pk(xsk), commit(xζ , xtsk),
clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf , clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xtsk)), xmsg)
The first equation is used to verify the signature proof of knowledge produced
by the trusted platform during the join algorithm and the second is used by a
trusted platform during the sign algorithm to assert group membership.
5.4. Model in applied pi
The RSA-based join and sign algorithms are modelled by the pair of pro-
cesses 〈JoinRSA,SignRSA〉 presented in Figure 6, where c(x1, . . . , xn).P denotes
c(x).let x1 = pi1(x) in . . . let xn = pin(x) in P . The join process JoinRSA is in-
stantiated by inputting the join algorithm’s parameters: the RSA-based DAA
system parameters wparams, the TPM’s internal secret wDAASeed, the counter
value wcnt chosen by the host, and the TPM’s endorsement key wek. The sys-
tem parameters wparams are expected to be a triple containing the DAA public
key wpk, basename wbsnI , and long-term key KI . The process constructs the
terms NI and U in accordance with the protocol’s description (Section 5.2) and
outputs the values to the issuer. The process then receives a ciphertext x, which
it decrypts, and outputs the hash of the plaintext paired with U . A nonce y is
then input and a signature proof of knowledge is produced, using y as a source
of randomness in the proof. Finally, the process inputs a signature z on the
commitment U and concludes by outputting the attestation identity credential
cre and TPM’s secret tsk on the private channel a′j , that is, the JoinRSA process
returns the values cre and tsk to the Signer process. The sign process SignRSA
is instantiated by inputting the sign algorithm’s parameters: the RSA-based
DAA system parameters wparams, the verifier’s basename wbsn, the message wmsg
to be signed, the attestation identity credential wcre, and the TPM’s secret wtsk.
(For simplicity, we do not capture the possibility of signing a message produced
by the TPM using private data.) The process recovers the DAA public key wpk
from the system parameters, and inputs a nonce x from the verifier. The if-then-
else branch models the signer’s ability to produce either linkable or unlinkable
signatures, based upon the parameter wbsn, in particular, the if-branch produces
an unlinkable signature, whereas the else-branch produces a linkable signature.
The process concludes by outputting a signature on the private channel a′s, that
is, the SignRSA process returns the signature to the Signer process.
5.5. Analysis: Violating privacy
The DAA game biprocess DAA-GRSA derived from 〈JoinRSA,SignRSA〉 does
not satisfy privacy. Informally, this can be observed by consideration of the
following adversaries.
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Figure 6 Applied pi processes for RSA-based DAA
JoinRSA =ˆ
aj(wparams, wDAASeed, wcnt, wek) . ν v
′ .
let wpk = pi1(wparams) in
let wbsnI = pi2(wparams) in
let wK = pi3(wparams) in
let ζI = hash(0, wbsnI) in
let tsk = hash(hash(wDAASeed, hash(wK)), wcnt, 0) in
let NI = commit(ζI , tsk) in
let U = clcommit(wpk, v
′, tsk) in
c〈(NI , U )〉 . c(x) . c〈hash(U, dec(wek, x))〉 . c(y) . ν nt .
c〈(nt, spk(Fjoin, (tsk, v′), (ζI , wpk, NI , U, (nt, y))))〉 .
c(z) . let cre = clopen(wpk, v
′, z) in
if checkclsign(wpk, tsk, cre) = accept then
a′j〈(cre, tsk)〉
SignRSA =ˆ
as(wparams, wbsn, wmsg, wcre, wtsk) .
let wpk = pi1(wparams) in
c(x) . ν nt . ν w .
if wbsn =⊥ then
ν ζ .
let ĉre = clcommit(wpk, w, wcre) in
let NV = commit(ζ, wtsk) in
let spk = spk(Fsign, (wtsk, w), (ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, (nt, x, wmsg ))) in
a′s〈(ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, nt, spk)〉
else
let ζ = hash(0, wbsn) in
let ĉre = clcommit(wpk, w, wcre) in
let NV = commit(ζ, wtsk) in
let spk = spk(Fsign, (wtsk, w), (ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, (nt, x, wmsg ))) in
a′s〈(ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, nt, spk)〉
Passive adversary. A passive adversary can violate privacy under the following
assumptions: first, the identity of a trusted platform can be observed during the
join algorithm2; secondly, there exists a basename which is shared between an
issuer and a verifier; and, thirdly, a signer is willing to use the same basename
with an issuer and verifier. By our second assumption, there exists an issuer’s
2The RSA-based DAA protocol [14] does not specify how the issuer learns a trusted plat-
form’s public endorsement key during an execution of the join algorithm. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that the public key would be sent as plaintext. By contrast, Cesena
et al. [28, 27] define an extension of RSA-based DAA which uses TLS to hide the affiliation
between groups and trusted platforms, this variant would thwart a passive adversary, but not
corrupt issuers and verifiers.
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basename bsnI and a verifier’s basename bsn such that bsnI = bsn. The attack
proceeds as follows. Let us suppose that the trusted platform executes the
join protocol with the issuer and subsequently runs the sign protocol with the
verifier. Since the signer is willing to use the same basename with an issuer and
verifier, it follows that ζI = ζ and NI = NV . The commitments NI and NV
are unique for a particular signer and the adversary knows the identity of the
trusted platform that produced NI during the join algorithm, it follows that the
signer’s identity can be revealed.
Corrupt issuers and verifiers. Corrupt issuers and verifiers can violate privacy
under the assumption that a signer is willing to use the same basename with an
issuer and verifier. This is a special case of our passive attack: an issuer and
verifier conspire to use the same basename (that is, bsnI = bsn) and since the
issuer knows the identity of the trusted platform that produced NI , the identity
of the signer can be revealed.
The linchpin of these attacks is the willingness of a signer to use the same
basename with an issuer and verifier. This can be justified as follows. Firstly,
this mode of operation is not explicitly forbidden by the protocol definition [14].
Secondly, this behaviour is expected when the issuer and verifier are the same
entity, as demonstrated by Camenisch et al. [24, 23] in the idemix system, for
example. Finally, the signer has insufficient resources to detect the use of the
same basename with an issuer and verifier.
Formally, Theorem 1 demonstrates that DAA-GRSA does not satisfy privacy.
This result is witnessed using a context C[ ] such that fst(C[DAA-GRSA]) −→∗ Q
and Q can output on channel b, but there is no reduction snd(C[DAA-GRSA]) −→∗
Q′ such that Q′ can output on b, where both reductions are of the same length.
Intuitively, the context behaves as follows. First, the context outputs system pa-
rameters (pk(skI), bsn,KI ). Secondly, the context executes the join algorithm
with both signers and binds (commit(hash(0, bsn), tsk), clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk))
to x, where tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(KI)), cnt, 0) and cnt, DAASeed and
v′ are restricted names. Thirdly, the context issues a challenge using the base-
name bsn and message msg, and binds T to y, where pi3(T ) = commit(hash(0,
bsn),diff[tsk, tsk′]), tsk′ = hash(hash(DAASeed′, hash(KI)), cnt′, 0), and cnt′
and DAASeed′ are restricted names. Finally, the context compares pi1(x) and
pi3(y) to derive a distinction between fst(C[DAA-GRSA]) and snd(C[DAA-GRSA]).
Theorem 1. The pair of processes 〈JoinRSA,SignRSA〉 do not satisfy privacy.
Proof. Let DAA-GRSA be the DAA game biprocess derived from 〈JoinRSA,SignRSA〉
and consider the evaluation context C[ ] defined below:
| c〈(pk(skI), bsn,KI )〉 .
c(w) . c(x) . c〈penc(w, n, ne)〉 . c(za) . if za = hash(ne, pi2(x)) then
c〈ni〉 . c(zs) . c〈clsign(skI , e, v′′, pi2(x))〉 .
c(w′) . c(x′) . c〈penc(w′, n, ne)〉 . c(z′a) . if z′a = hash(ne, pi2(x′)) then
c〈ni〉 . c(z′s) . c〈clsign(skI , e, v′′, pi2(x′))〉 .
c〈(bsn,msg)〉 . c〈nv〉 . c(y) . if pi1(x) = pi3(y) then b〈fail〉 else 0
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We have the following reductions:
fst(C[DAA-GRSA]) −→∗ C ′[if M = M then b〈fail〉 else 0]
snd(C[DAA-GRSA]) −→∗ C ′[if M = N then b〈fail〉 else 0],
whereM = commit(hash(0, bsn), hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(KI)), cnt, 0)) andN =
commit(hash(0, bsn), hash(hash(DAASeed′, hash(KI)), cnt′, 0)). It follows that
fst(C[DAA-GRSA]) 6∼ snd(C[DAA-GRSA]) because fst(C[DAA-GRSA]) can output
on channel b but snd(C[DAA-GRSA]) cannot and, therefore, DAA-GRSA does not
satisfy privacy.
The context C[ ] was discovered by manual reasoning and, subsequently, we
found that ProVerif finds a similar context. (Analysis takes 39 seconds using
ProVerif 1.86pl3 on CentOS 5.7 with 2.40GHz Intel Xeon and 4GB memory. Our
ProVerif scripts are available online.) An attack in the computational model
follows immediately from our result in the symbolic setting (Theorem 1), see
Smyth [61, Appendix B] for details.
5.6. Solution: Fixing RSA-based DAA
The protocol can be fixed by refining the definition of ζ, namely, let 〈JoinRSA′ ,
SignRSA′〉 refine 〈JoinRSA,SignRSA〉 by redefining ζ as ζ = hash(1, bsn). The at-
tacks presented are no longer possible, regardless of whether bsnI = bsn. Fur-
thermore, the revised pair of processes 〈JoinRSA′ ,SignRSA′〉 satisfy privacy; this
can be automatically verified using ProVerif (verification takes 26 seconds using
ProVerif 1.86pl3 on CentOS 5.7 with 2.40GHz Intel Xeon and 4GB memory;
our ProVerif scripts are available online).
5.7. Limitations
Our representation of cryptographic primitives and relations between prim-
itives (Section 5.3) is an abstraction. For instance, we assume cryptography
is perfect (i.e., the attacker is only able to perform cryptographic operations
when in possession of the required keys) and do not capture the low-level math-
ematical details of the cryptography. Moreover, on the basis that both the host
and TPM must be honest for privacy, we do not distinguish between operations
performed by the host and TPM. The difficulty of capturing cryptography in
the symbolic model is well known [60, 2, 3, 70, 71] and is particularly diffi-
cult in this instance due to the complexity of DAA. Nevertheless, our analysis
(Section 5.5) discovers an attack against the RSA-based DAA protocol, thereby
demonstrating the practicalitiy of symbolic analysis. However, we acknowledge
that our security results for the fixed RSA-based DAA protocol (Section 5.6)
do not imply the absence of real-world attacks, due to the gulf between our
symbolic representation of cryptography and the concrete implementation.
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6. Balancing privacy and accountability
Balancing the privacy demands of users and the accountability needs of is-
suers and verifiers is a fundamental objective of Direct Anonymous Attestation
schemes, in particular, DAA schemes permit signatures to be linked, without
revealing the identity of the signer. The degrees of linkability are identified
below, with reference to an application domain in which an honest issuer of-
fers membership to a single group of signers and several verifiers offer multiple
services.
• Single-service linkability. A verifier offering a single service is able to link
transactions made by a given signer.
• Cross-service linkability. A verifier offering multiple services is able to
link transactions made by a given signer over multiple services, when the
services share the same basename.
• Cross-verifier linkability. Multiple verifiers offering services are able to
link transactions made by a given signer across all the verifiers, when the
services share the same basename.
In this section, we reflect upon the notions of linkability for Direct Anonymous
Attestation schemes and extend the degree of privacy available in such schemes.
6.1. Linkability between an issuer’s groups
Let us identify an issuer by its long-term key KI , and recall that the game-
based security definition by Brickell, Chen & Li [17, 18] assumes that an issuer
controls a single group of signers, where the group of signers is identified by a
public key pk(skI). In this section, we generalise to the situation in which an
issuer may issue credentials to several groups of signers, where each group of
signers is associated with a different key pk(skI). In this situation, one can ask
the following question:
• Can a verifier link two signatures constructed using distinct DAA public
keys pk(skI) and pk(sk
′
I), each belonging to the same issuer? We call this
linkability between an issuer’s groups.
The RSA-based scheme permits linkability between an issuer’s groups, when the
signatures share the same basename. This can be observed as follows: given the
issuer’s long-term key KI and the basename bsn such that bsn 6= ⊥, the TPM’s
secret tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(KI)), cnt, 0) and signatures produced us-
ing tsk will include NV = commit(ζ, tsk), where ζ = hash(1, bsn). (In the
computational setting, linkability between an issuer’s groups assumes that the
groups’ public keys share the same modulus Γ and order ρ, see [14, §4.3] for defi-
nitions of Γ and ρ.) We can modify the RSA-based scheme to prevent linkability
between an issuer’s groups by defining ζ = hash(1, bsn, pk(skI)), rather than
ζ = hash(1, bsn). Intuitively, linkability between an issuer’s groups strength-
ens accountability and weakens privacy, hence, the original RSA-based scheme
provides stronger accountability, whereas our modification provides stronger
privacy.
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6.2. Practical guidelines for basenames
Basenames are particularly sensitive for DAA because they enable linkability
and the ability to uniquely identify a set of services for which a basename can be
used is a prerequisite of user-controlled linkability. However, no methodology
for basename construction has been defined and this may lead to a security
vulnerability. For example, a signer may inadvertently permit signatures to be
linked, simply by using the same basename for multiple signatures; we argue
that this scenario is likely because signers have insufficient resources to maintain
a history of all basenames. We overcome this problem with the presentation
of guidelines for the construction of basenames. First, basenames should be
constructed from service-specific data such as the following:
• Service information, for example, issuer’s public key, verifier’s public key,
service URL, and terms and conditions of service.
• Basename validity date, for example, start and expiry dates.
• DAA signing mode, for example, Attestation Identity Key (AIK) sign-
ing, Platform Configuration Register (PCR) signing, and external input
signing.
Secondly, given a basename constructed in this manner, a signer can evaluate
whether the basename is suitable for use with a particular service. It follows
immediately that our construction helps inform a signer that signatures can be
linked.
7. Further work and conclusion
Direct Anonymous Attestation is a relatively new concept and its properties
merit further study, in particular, correctness, linkability, non-frameability and
unforgeability have received limited attention. Extending this work to include
a complete definition of DAA properties would be an interesting direction for
the future. Moreover, establishing a unified definition which includes all proper-
ties (that is, anonymity, correctness, linkability, non-frameability, unforgeability,
and unlinkability) would be of interest to reduce the verification workload. As
a starting point, this could be achieved by developing the formalisation of join
and sign algorithms, modelled by 〈Join,Sign〉, to distinguish between operations
performed by the host and those performed by the TPM. This distinction is
not necessary for our definition of privacy because this property can only be
achieved if both the host and TPM are trusted. By contrast, a corrupt host
– even in collaboration with a corrupt TPM (where the TPM is known to be
rogue) – should not be able to violate accountability properties and, therefore,
an alternative model of 〈Join,Sign〉 would be required such that the actions
performed by the host and TPM are distinguished.
For privacy it is necessary to ensure a distinct basename is used during the
Challenge. Since the applied pi calculus does not record state, this is achieved
by an abstraction. Accordingly, we believe the definition is necessary, but may
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not be sufficient. This limitation could be overcome by introducing a stateful
variant of the applied pi calculus, indeed, Arapinis, Ritter & Ryan [6] make
some progress in this direction. A further limitation of our privacy definition
is the restriction to settings with one issuer, indeed, this corresponds to the
cryptographic game. Extending the definition to multiple issuers remains as
future work.
Conclusion. This article presents a definition of privacy for Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocols. The definition is expressed as an equivalence property
which is suited to automated reasoning and the practicality of the approach
is demonstrated by evaluating the RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
protocol. The RSA-based scheme is particularly significant because support is
mandated by the TPM specification version 1.2, which has been implemented
and deployed in over 500 million computers (although the number of TPMs in
active use is estimated to be significantly smaller). The analysis discovers a
vulnerability which can be exploited by a passive adversary and, under weaker
assumptions, by corrupt issuers and verifiers. A security fix is identified and the
revised protocol is shown to satisfy our definition of privacy. The fix only affects
the host’s part of the protocol and, therefore, no hardware changes to the TPM
are required. Furthermore, the fix has influenced the design of subsequent DAA
schemes, for example, [16, 18].
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Appendix A. A brief review of DAA schemes
The first concrete Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme was introduced by
Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [14] and is based upon RSA. However, RSA-based
cryptography requires larger keys than equivalent ECC-based schemes. More-
over, the RSA-based DAA protocol is reliant on the strong RSA and decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumptions, and some users are uncomfortable with the strong
RSA assumption. This motivated the work of Brickell, Chen & Li [16, 18]
who provide the first ECC-based DAA protocol using symmetric pairing. This
scheme is more efficient and, therefore, better suited to devices with limited
resources, such as the TPM. Furthermore, the ECC-based protocol is reliant
on the LRSW [53] and decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions, which
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some users may prefer. Chen, Morrissey & Smart [34, 35] extended the scheme
based upon symmetric pairing to an asymmetric setting to improve efficiency.
However, Li discovered a vulnerability in the asymmetric scheme which violates
basename linkability and Chen & Li propose a fix [32]; a further attack has
been identified by Chen, Morrissey & Smart [36] which, in theory, violates un-
forgeability. In addition, Chen, Morrissey & Smart [37] have found theoretical
accountability attacks against the symmetric pairing based scheme [16, 18] and
the original RSA-based scheme [14]. The Chen, Morrissey & Smart [36, 37]
attacks allow a malicious host to extract the TPM’s secret tsk, if the protocol
is implemented in hardware without stage control mechanisms; the host can
then forge signatures. However, since the TPM provides stage control protec-
tion, there is no practical threat in the current setting; but, these attacks are of
practical interest because they identify settings in which DAA protocols cannot
be deployed (for example, in other trusted computing settings which do not
use the TPM). We remark that the analysis of unforgeability in the RSA-based
scheme by Backes, Maffei & Unruh [8] could not identify the Chen, Morrissey
& Smart attack because they consider a setting where the host and TPM are
both honest. Chen, Morrissey & Smart [36, 37] also propose a new asymmet-
ric scheme and Chen, Page & Smart [38] propose an optimisation, moreover,
Chen [30] provides a further optimisation to the Chen, Page & Smart scheme.
Brickell, Chen & Li [19] have shown that an adversary can forge signatures in
the variant by Chen and propose a fix. We are aware of six further ECC-based
DAA protocols: Chen & Feng [39], Brickell & Li [20, 21], Chen [29, 31], Brickell
& Li [22], Bernhard et al. [10], and Bernhard, Fuchsbauer & Ghadafi [9].
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